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JUSTICE SCALIA'S FOOTPRINTS ON THE PUBLIC LANDS
BRET

C. BIRDSONGt

ABSTRACT

This article explores Justice Scalia's views ofjudicial review of administrative action, as revealed in his writings on public land law, as both a
scholarand a Supreme Courtjustice. It examines and explains why Professor Scaliafavoredjudicialreview of public land administrationwhile
Justice Scalia seems to abhor it. In a sweeping law review articlepublished in 1970, Professor Scalia argued that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity historicallydid not apply in public lands cases. On the Court
he has penned two of the most significant decisions addressingjudicial
review of public lands administration, each of them imposing new restrictions (or reviving old ones) on the availabilityofjudicial redressfor
executive unlawfulness. In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation
("Lujan I"), Justice Scalia used the law of standing, injected with separation of powers principles, to foreclose programmaticjudicial review of
public land classification. And last year, in Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance ("SUWA"), he used traditionalmandamus principles to foreclose judicialreview of officials' allegedfailure to achieve a
plain congressionalmandate to maintain the wilderness quality of public
lands. Justice Scalia's imprint on public land law was foretold by his
scholarly writings, including his public lands article, which place great
emphasis on protecting executive discretion. He favors judicial review
for the vindication of traditionalprivate rights while disfavoring it as a
means of ensuring the implementation of statutory,public values in the
face of the contrary exercise of executive discretion.
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INTRODUCTION

It is bombastic, perhaps, but not inaccurate to say that before there
was administrative law there was public land law. During the first century and a half of this nation's history, probably the federal government's
most daunting administrative task was the management and administration of vast holdings of public land.' Then, and possibly now, the public
lands are a harbinger of American administrative law.
This article will examine Justice Scalia's views ofjudicial review of
administrative action, as revealed in his writings on public land law, as
both a scholar and a Supreme Court justice. Well before he joined the
Supreme Court, Scalia had established his stature as an administrative
law scholar.2 During a hiatus from academia in the early 1970s, he
served as the chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United
States.3 Upon his return to the cloistered fold, he continued as a player in
Washington regulatory world as editor of the influential journal Regulation.4 In 1982, President Reagan appointed him to the D.C. Circuit court
1. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 231,414-19, 439 (2d ed.
1985); see generally PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968).

2.
In addition to the article explored at length in Part I of this article, to further examine
Scalia's significant scholarship on administrative law see Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The
A.P.A., the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345; Antonin Scalia, The
Hearing ExaminerLoan Program, 1971 DUKE L.J. 319; Antonin Scalia, Responsibilitiesof Regulatory Agencies under Environmental Laws, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 97 (1987); JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; and Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman,
ProceduralAspects of the ConsumerProduct Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899 (1973).
3.
The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographies
current.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
4. About Regulation Magazine, http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulationlabout.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2005).
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of appeals, where his influence and expertise in administrative law
grew.5 He has parlayed his expertise into influence on 6the Court as the
author of several important administrative law decisions.
Antonin Scalia is no tenderfoot, either, when it comes to public land
law; he is a sourdough indeed.7 As an assistant professor at the University of Virginia, Scalia authored a sweeping article-the most substantial
of his early writings-that analyzed the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in public lands cases. 8 He argued that courts had traditionally not applied
sovereign immunity in public lands cases, creating a historical and categorical exception to the doctrine's insulation from judicial review of administrative action. 9 On the Court he has penned two of the most significant decisions addressing judicial review of public lands administration,
each of them imposing new restrictions (or reviving old ones) on the
availability of judicial redress for executive unlawfulness. In Lujan v.
1° Justice Scalia used the law of
National Wildlife Federation (Lujan I),
standing, injected with separation of powers principles, to foreclose programmatic judicial review of public land classification." And last year,
in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA),12 he used traditional mandamus principles to foreclose judicial review of officials' alleged failure to achieve a plain congressional
mandate to maintain the
13
wilderness quality of public lands.
A primary goal of this article is to examine and explain why, at a
level one step removed from doctrinal specifics, Professor Scalia favored
judicial review of public land administration while Justice Scalia seems
to abhor it. On first consideration, it might appear that Justice Scalia has
had a change of heart regarding the proper role of the judiciary. But this
is not necessarily so. What came between his pronouncements as a public
land scholar and those as a public land justice was a transformation not
just of public land law but of administrative law in general. 14 A system of
rules developed initially to govern administration of private rights in
5.
Justices of the Supreme Court, supranote 3.
6. E.g., American Trucking Ass'n v. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). See generally Bernard
Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player"?Justice Scalia and Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV.
1(1995).
7.
The term "tenderfoot," as used by late-nineteenth century settlers in the American west,
referred to a newly arrived emigrant, not yet hardened to the difficulties of frontier life. The term
"sourdough," as used in the mining towns of Alaska and the Yukon, referred to a seasoned, experienced prospector. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2178, 2355 (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 1986).
8.
Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrative
Action: Some Conclusionsfrom the Public-Lands Cases,68 MICH. L. REV. 867 (1970).
9.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 885.
10.
497 U.S. 871 (1990).
11.
Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 899.
12.
124 S.Ct. 2373 (2004).
13.
SUWA, 124 S.Ct. at 2379-80.
14.
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667,1669 (1975).
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public lands evolved into a system of rules intended to ensure the adequate representation of the public interest in the administration of public
law. In the public land context specifically, in the interval between
Scalia's academic and judicial writings, Congress drew the curtain on the
"age of disposition," during which federal policy promoted the privatization of public lands, in favor of a policy of federal retention and management of public lands for public purposes established by statute. 15
Justice Scalia's apparent reformation more likely reveals a steady
bearing in the changing tide of the law. That bearing is one which favors
judicial review of the administration of public laws impacting traditional
private rights or creating their equivalent. But the same bearing disfavors (or at least seeks to limit) judicial review of the administration of
public laws that benefit individuals or groups representing some broader
aspect of the public interest. Seen in this light, Justice Scalia's writings
on public land law are perhaps the clearest indication of the course he
would chart for the law of judicial review of administrative action.
This article will proceed in three parts. Part One will examine Professor Scalia's article on sovereign immunity in the public land cases. It
traces the themes in Scalia's early thinking about public land law and
judicial review. One theme is his understanding of public land cases as a
distinct body of law with a tradition of nonstatutory judicial review that
persevered in the face of the expanding doctrine of federal sovereign
immunity. A countervailing theme, however, is his preference for protecting executive discretion from judicial interference by means of other
doctrines, specifically standing and mandamus.
Part Two follows these themes through Justice Scalia's public lands
jurisprudence, examining Lujan I and SUWA in detail. It shows that,
while predictable, Scalia's invigoration of standing and mandamus principles in those cases represents his imposition of his own scholarly abstractions on the development of the law of judicial review-something
he admonished scholars against early in his academic career.
Part Three seeks to make sense of the path Scalia has forged in the
context of modem administrative law. It explores the "reformation" of
public land law and administrative law during the interval between his
academic and his judicial writings. It recasts Scalia's proclaimed reliance on standing and mandamus doctrine as an effort to effect a "counterreformation" of administrative law and to diminish the role of courts
as vindicators of public interest values. It shows that these writings press
against the tides of "reformed" administrative law by seeking to limit
judicial review of administrative decisions adversely affecting public
interest litigants. In this light, Scalia's footprints on the public lands are
15.
GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW Part A, Ch. 2, §2:1 (2005).
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properly viewed as leading to the development of different standards for
the availability of judicial review for private interest litigants than for
public interest litigants-a theme that Justice Scalia likely portends for
administrative law in general.
I. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCLUSIONSFROM THE PUBLIC-LANDS CASES
It is surprising, given the path he has forged, that chance probably
led Antonin Scalia to the public lands. In 1967, he joined the law faculty
of the University of Virginia, where his senior colleague Carl McFarland
chaired the Public Land Law Review Commission, a congressionallymandated effort to suggest how the unruly field of public land law might
be brought to order. 16 At the time, both sovereign immunity and "nonstatutory review" of federal administrative action were garnering considerable attention from administrative law scholars. Almost universally,
scholars loathed sovereign immunity.17 Scalia's Conclusions from the
Public-Lands Cases, written with the "advice and encouragement" of
Professor McFarland, 18 made a significant contribution to that literature,
arguing that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was never properly applied in public lands cases and urging a return to the historical norm.
Scalia framed his analysis of sovereign immunity in Conclusions
from the Public- Lands Cases with an inquiry into disparate outcomes in
two then-recent cases seeking specific relief against federal officers administering the public lands.' 9 In Malone v. Bowdoin,20 the plaintiffs
brought an ejectment action against a Forest Service official who asserted title on behalf of the United States. 2' The plaintiffs alleged that
the putative fee title on which the Forest Service defended its possession
had been granted by a person, since deceased, who had owned only a life
estate, with the remainder in the plaintiffs. 22 The Supreme Court held the
complaint was properly dismissed on grounds that sovereign immunity
barred a suit for specific relief against the Forest Service officer under
the circumstances alleged2 3 In so holding, the Court applied a rule set
16.
Inventory of the Papers of Carl McFarland, http://www.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/
lawweb2.nsf/0/4b6e9b7556a137cf8525675200553ab0?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
17.
Scalia wrote:
If there is one legal development (or, perhaps more accurately, nondevelopment) found in
the pages of the United States reports during the present century which would cause the
credulous observer to doubt the truth of [the] axiom [that scholarly criticism is a restraint
against judicial arbitrariness], it is the continued good health of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 867. Scalia cited a string of commentary dating to 1884, including Kenneth
Culp Davis's classic treatise, which summarily stated, "nearly every commentator who considers the
subject vigorously asserts that the doctrine of sovereign immunity must go." Id. at 867 n. 1 (citing 3
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 435 (1st ed. 1958)).
18.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 867 n.*.
19.
Scalia, supranote 8, at 872-82.

20.

369 U.S. 643 (1962).

21.
22.

Malone, 369 U.S. at 643.
Id.

23.

Id. at 648.
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4
out in Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corporation2
in an
'
earlier attempt to "cut[] through the tangle of previous decisions 25 and
"resolve the conflict in [sovereign immunity] doctrine. 26

In contrast, sovereign immunity posed no obstacle to the invocation
of federal judicial power against a federal land official in Udall v.
Tallman, 7 a mandamus action which sought to compel the Secretary of
the Interior to issue federal oil and gas leases to applicants he had earlier
denied.28 Not only did the Court not base its decision on sovereign immunity, but the doctrine was not even mentioned by the Supreme Court,
the court of appeals, the trial court, or any of the parties' pleadings or
briefs throughout the litigation.2 9 Scalia's curiosity was justly piqued.
Surely a deeper blow at the United States's sovereignty is struck by "demand[ing] [the] transfer of [a] legal interest which could be effected only
by the United States" and which had been denied after extensive administrative proceedings pursuant to an act of Congress than by merely seeking to enforce a right of possession through a chain-of-title analysis that
required no positive action by the government and which fell within the
accepted competency of courts.3 °
Scalia concluded that the Court's application of sovereign immunity
in Malone was wrong and disregard of it in Tallman was correct as a
historical, if not doctrinal, matter.3' In so concluding, Scalia reviewed
the history of public land litigation dating from the nineteenth century
during which sovereign immunity posed no bar, closely analyzed a hand24. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
25. Malone, 369 U.S. at 647.
26. Larson, 337 U.S. at 701. Larson's rule, supposedly distilled from the cases in Chief Justice Vinson's plurality opinion, was that sovereign immunity bars suits for specific relief against an
officer of the sovereign actions except when the officer's action "is not within the officer's statutory
powers or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the particular case, are
constitutionally void." Id. at 702. Larson cast in doubt, but did not overrule, a celebrated case involving the widow of General Robert E. Lee, whose Arlington, Virginia, estate had been seized by
federal officers for nonpayment of taxes. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). In Lee, the
Court had explicitly rejected sovereign immunity as an obstacle to Mrs. Lee's ejectment action. Lee,
106 U.S. at 251.
27. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
28. Udall, 380 U.S. at 3.
29. Scalia, supra note 8, at 877.
30. Id. at 876-77. Scalia carefully analyzed and dismissed the likely explanations why sovereign immunity might not have been decisive in Tallman. He dispatched with possible arguments
that the failure to issue the lease fell within the ultra-vires-or-otherwise-unconstitutiona exceptions
of Larson, that the Mineral Leasing Act governing the leases in Tallman waived sovereign immunity, and that Court's failure to apply sovereign immunity was the result of it not having been so
urged by the Solicitor General. Id. at 877-80. With the same pointed wit he would later famously
direct at others, including his colleagues on the Court, Scalia suggested that his own sense of "surprise" that the Solicitor General failed to raise sovereign immunity might, to a skeptic of Scalia's
view, be "akin to a child's astonishment at watching a tight-rope walker for the first time-how
marvelous that he should not only walk along such a narrow wire, but carry and balance a long stick
at the same time!" Id. at 879-80. Nonetheless, he parried the suggested infirmity by pointing out
that only Congress, not inaction by a federal officer, can waive sovereign immunity and that the
doctrine is jurisdictional and is properly raised sua sponte by a court. Id. at 880.
31.
Id. at 909, 919.
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ful of public lands cases in which the Court-erroneously, in his viewapplied sovereign immunity in the early twentieth century, and argued
that Tallman's result was in historical repose notwithstanding its irreconcilable inconsistency with Larson's putative unified theory of sovereign
immunity.32 Public lands cases, according to Scalia, simply represent a
historically distinct category of cases in which nonstatutory review of
federal administrative action was properly available in spite of sovereign
immunity.33 Whether as oracle or prophet, Scalia concludes:
[H]owever solid and permanent that unifying theory may be, it will
not be applied to the area of nonstatutory review of public-lands determinations. The accumulated mass of decisional law in this area
contrary to Larson is too overwhelming; and in the conflict, it is the
general rather than the specific, the theoretical rather than the practical, the abstract thesis rather than the historical actuality, which will
yield.34

There are four strains of Scalia's thinking in Conclusionsfrom the
Public-Lands Cases that merit further elaboration-the explicit recognition of public lands cases as an "existential" category of cases within
which doctrine might acceptably develop that is inconsistent with
broader theoretical justification or application; the recognition that judicial review had been and should be available in public lands cases; his
favoritism for both standing and traditional mandamus standards as
means to protect executive discretion from judicial encroachment; and
his criticism of scholars-albeit gentle-for a tendency to impose theoretical, generalized principles on the common law rather than deriving
them from it.
A. Public Lands Cases as an "Existential" Category ofLaw
The first important strand of Scalia's analysis of sovereign immunity and public lands cases is his emphatic claim that public lands cases
are an "existential" category of cases to which the unified doctrine of
sovereign immunity does not apply. After much careful analysis of how
the Court applied sovereign immunity doctrine to several public lands
cases in a series of missteps, mistakes, and results-orientated selfprotection,35 he comes to the shrugging conclusion that sovereign immunity does not apply in public lands cases simply because public lands

32. Id. at 909-20.
33.
Id. at 909.
34. Id. Scalia makes clear his normative belief in this historical dialectic. The "correct"
general conclusion to be drawn from his analysis of the public lands cases is that "[n]either Larson,
nor any other theory which purports to provide a universally valid standard for the applicability of
sovereign immunity to suits against federal officials, can or will be followed unless it either rejects
sovereign immunity entirely or contains an exclusionary factor based plainly and simply upon historical prescription," Id. at 912-13.
35.
See id. at 886-909.
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cases are a category of cases in which the doctrine does not apply. 36 He
supports his view not by providing theoretical or doctrinal reasons why
public lands cases are different from others seeking relief against federal
executive officials but by pointing out that there are other "existential"
categories of cases in which the same is true, namely post office cases
and tax cases. 37 These categories are "well-defined and fully developed
'existential' categories of legal activity" outside the rubric of sovereign
immunity.3 8 In this view, public lands cases are not simply an indistinct
subset of the vast population of sovereign immunity cases posing
"unique or rarely recurring fact situations"; they "constitute what is
probably the oldest continuous body of federal case-law relating
to the
39
validity and effect of a particular type of administrative activity."
To be sure, Scalia's recognition that public lands cases form a distinct category in which courts could justifiably depart from theoretical
doctrine is based on a pragmatic appreciation of attorney and judicial
practice rather than principle. Though the existence of a public lands
"category" of cases justifies departure from Larson's supposedly unifying theory of sovereign immunity, that is solely due to the fact that "the
actual development of the law has to a large extent been compartmentalized-into, for example, public-lands cases, post-office cases, and tax
cases." 40 As a practical matter, lawyers and judges seek answers to legal
issues in those distinct compartments of factually similar, commonly
pedigreed cases. 4 1 Scalia quips that a lawyer casually speaking with another would likely describe the case on which "he" was working as "a
products liability case, an automobile accident case, or an eviction case,"
but probably not as a "sovereign immunity case," even though sovereign
immunity might be an important contested issue.42 The same, he maintains, is true of a public lands case. Scalia explicitly states that "there is
in principlenothing distinctive about the public-lands cases" in comparison to other lawsuits seeking relief against federal administrative officers. 43 Nonetheless, what remains important here is that Scalia's compartmentalization of public lands cases justifies, in his view, the departure from theoretical doctrine. His analysis exalts pragmatism at the expense of theory.

36. Id. at 909.
37. Id. at 913-15.
38. Id. at 882.
39. Id.
40. Id.at 919.
41.
See id. at 918-19 (describing how federal appellate judges had disregarded Larson in
public lands cases because "working always within the context of a particular set of facts, the felt the
pull of factually similar precedent.").
42. Id.at 882.
43. Id. at 919.
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B. The Availability ofNonstatutory Review in PublicLands Cases
Another important strand of Scalia's thinking in Conclusions from
the Public-Lands Cases is his embrace of "nonstatutory" review as a
mechanism for judicial oversight of public lands determinations by administrative officials. Nonstatutory review refers to judicial review of
administrative action that is not obtained under a specific statutory provision creating a right to judicial review. 44 Before the Administrative Procedure Act 45 and other modem legislation 46 created generally applicable
rights of action for injunctive and other specific relief against government officials, judicially-crafted "nonstatutory" review provided the only
means to challenge federal administrative action.47 It is generally considered to encompass actions for injunction, declaratory judgment, mandamus and other specific relief.48 As Scalia himself described, it is:
[T]he type of review of administrative action which is available, not
by virtue of those explicit review provisions contained in most modem statutes which create administrative agencies, but rather through
the use of traditional common-law remedies ...

against the officer

who is allegedly misapplying
his statutory authority or exceeding his
49
constitutional power.
As Professor Siegel has noted, today's lawyer versed in judicial review
under the APA might understandably be unfamiliar with nonstatutory
review.50 Yet nonstatutory review remains important for the insight it
provides on the legal theory of suing the government and, equally impor-

44.
See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrative Action: The
Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matier Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV.387, 395 (1970). In focusing on nonstatutory review and sovereign immunity, Scalia placed himself in the company of several administrative law luminaries examining the
same topics. Professor Cramton's study was published in the same volume of the Michigan Law
Review as Scalia's Conclusionsfrom the Public-Lands Cases. See also, Kenneth Culp Davis, Suing
the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1962); Louis L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 197-256 (1965); Clark Byse, Proposed

Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" JudicialReview: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties,
Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1479 (1962); Clark Byse & Joseph V. Fiocca, Section 1361 of the
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of FederalAdministrative
Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1967).
45.
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2005).
46.
The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2005).
47.
Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1612, 1625 (1997). Professor Siegel recounts many of the famous cases that proceeded by
means of nonstatutory review, including: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803);
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer (the Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
48. See, Cramton, supranote 44, at 395 n.28.
49.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 870.
50.
Siegel, supra note 47, at 1625. In 1976, Congress amended the APA to waive sovereign
immunity in suits seeking relief "other than money damages" against the United States and its officers. Before 1976, there had been some disagreement as to whether the APA's provision of a right
to judicial review also amounted to a waiver of sovereign immunity, but the bulk of authority held
that it did not. Id. at 1623.
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tant here, the Justice Scalia's attitude regarding the role of the judiciary
in providing relief against governmental wrongdoing.
Nonstatutory review, and the inapplicability of sovereign immunity
it entailed, permitted an individual injured by a government official's
conduct to bring an action against the official, supposedly as a private,
rather than government, defendant. By ordering the official, in his individual capacity, to act or refrain from acting so as to remain within the
bounds of the law, courts could thus pretend that they were affording no
relief against the "immune" sovereign government. The supposition, of
course, was a fiction; a suit nominally against an individual officer was
really against the sovereign government. Our "government of laws, and
not of men, 51 depends wholly on individual officials to act, and the very
motivation of the fiction was to provide for some relief against the "individual" official to remedy the injustice at the hands of the sovereignwhat Professor Seigel calls the "remedial imperative. 52
Scalia's recognition of the tradition of nonstatutory review for public lands cases is important, first, for the mere fact of it. It is a recognition by Scalia that public lands cases constitute a category of cases for
which there historically existed a judicial remedy for government illegality, based, in a sense, on the remedial imperative. Though Scalia did not
use the words himself, administrative determinations relating to the public lands were subject to a "presumption of reviewability. 53 In this light,
Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases is more than an academic
statement-now moot because sovereign immunity has since been
waived-that sovereign immunity is not a bar to judicial review of public
lands cases. It is a statement that public lands administration historically
has been and ought to be subject to judicial review.
Second, Scalia's recognition of nonstatutory review for public lands
cases says something about his openness to judicial involvement in formulating judicial remedies for administrative wrongdoing. Despite its
name, there is some minor disagreement among scholars whether nonstatutory review is, in fact, extra-statutory. Professor Siegel, for example, characterizes nonstatutory review as a judge-made doctrine by
51.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
52.
Siegel, supranote 47, at 1627-28.
53.
See Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 423 (1958).
Professor Jaffe coined the phrase "presumption of reviewability." Id This was rooted it in a postoffice case, American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). In that case,
the court stated: "The acts of all ... officers must be justified by some law, and in case an official
violates the law to the injury of an individual the courts generally have jurisdiction to grant relief"
Id. at 108 (emphasis added). Scalia, for his part, cited the same case as the earliest in a line of authority that he said establishes "post-office cases" as a separate "existential" category of cases in
which private individuals could seek relief, by means of nonstatutory review and notwithstanding
sovereign immunity, for officials' incorrect interpretations of the mail statutes. Scalia, supra note 8,
at 913-14 n.215. Notably, Scalia pointed out that American School of Magnetic Healing"cited no
judicial precedent in support of its holding except public-lands cases." Id.
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means of which "courts could ensure the rule of law.

54

269

Professor Jaffe

famously reckoned that nonstatutory review was a facet of a "common
law of judicial review," and specifically noted that public lands was one
of several "important areas of administration . . .in which the federal

courts allow appropriate common-law proceedings to test the legality of
federal actions. 55 Scalia correctly points out that nonstatutory review
actions, like all others in federal court "are, strictly speaking, statutory,"
at least in the sense that federal court jurisdiction must derive from some
statute.56 In this view, "[s]o-called 'nonstatutory review' proceedings
are, more accurately, those which are brought under the statutes of general applicability, as opposed to statutes specifically designed to enable
judicial review of the actions of a particular agency or agencies.,,5' But
such hair splitting amounts to no more than a semantic quibble given
Scalia's explicit embrace of Jaffe's coining of a "common law of judicial
review,, 58 and his recognition that the common law of judicial review
applies not only to nonstatutory review, but also to "fill the numerous
interstices which any statutory-review provision contains. '59 Thus,
Scalia acknowledges without serious criticism the judicial role in creating, or enhancing, a practice (if not a theory) of nonstatutory judicial
review in public lands cases.60

54. Siegel, supra note 47, at 1631.
55. Jaffe, supranote 53, at 411. Jaffe also included within his construction of a common law
of judicial review the "whole congeries of judicial theories and practices which condition not only
the use of common-law writs but the statutory provisions [for judicial review] as well." Id. These
included the political question doctrine, sovereign immunity, exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the requirement of proper parties. Id.
56. Scalia, supra note 8, at 870 n.12. Scalia explains: "For example, a common type of
nonstatutory proceeding is the suit for injunction, brought under the 'federal question' provision and
the 'all writs' provision of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1651 (1962)--provisions which
may support suit against an official of any federal agency or indeed against private citizens." Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 870 ("These remedies gave rise to what Professor Jaffe has aptly called the 'common law of judicial review."').
59. Id. at 870 n.13.
60. Professor Siegel has convincingly shown that the nonstututory review, in both its inception and perseverance through numerous theoretical and practical challenges over the years, is
largely a creature of judicial ingenuity, even if subject matter jurisdiction originates from a statutory
grant. Siegel, supranote 47, at 1632. Propelled by the remedial imperative, judges first created the
legal fiction that permitted nonstatutory review proceedings to avoid the problem of sovereign immunity, and then revived it when the other doctrines began to obscure the essence and motivation of
the fiction and threatened to thwart the remedial imperative:
The ... unfolding of nonstatutory review was really the great testing of the remedial imperative through the medium of judicial creativity .... Again and again, judges demonstrated that the remedial imperative, operating through the mechanism of nonstatutory review, overcomes the assertion of sovereign immunity. This is not to say that nonstatutory
review always overcame every possible barrier to judicial relief, but it is to say that
judges, faced on the one hand with the need to provide relief to injured plaintiffs, and on
the other with a doctrine of sovereign immunity that never rested on a solid and commonly accepted basis, regarded the need to provide relief as more important than the
claim of the govemment to be free from judicial process. Judges refused to leave remediless those wronged by governmental action, even though sovereign immunity prevented a
straightforward suit against the government itself. The three themes noted above - a legal
doctrine that separates the government officer from the government, the motivations of
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Third, Scalia's discussion of the relationship between the right of
review under the APA and its nonstatutory review antecedents indicates
his belief in the vitality of nonstatutory review as a distinct theory of
judicial review which the courts are powerless to restrict. In a separate
appendix to his Conclusionfrom the Public-Lands Cases article, 6' Scalia
analyzed whether the provisions of the APA providing for judicial review, as originally enacted, waived sovereign immunity. He concluded
that, even though the APA was "jurisdictional" in the sense that it provided for subject matter jurisdiction, it was not "jurisdictional" in the
sense of waiving sovereign immunity. 62 He cited several cases, including Larson and Malone, brought after the enactment of the APA in which
the Court nonetheless held that sovereign immunity barred actions
against federal officials.6 3 As for the "many" public lands decisions
which refer to the action having been brought "under the APA" without
any reference to sovereign immunity, Scalia offers an explanation that is
"more limited than the hypothesis that the APA constitutes a general
waiver [of sovereign immunity], and which would reconcile these cases
with what appears to be the overwhelming weight of judicial opinion in
other fields, namely ... that there must be acknowledged a separate rule
for traditional 'nonstatutory review' cases. ' 64
Further, in the text of his article, Scalia characterizes the APA as a
congressional "restatement of the existing law" on judicial review of
administrative action. 65 The import of this view that the APA codified
the existing law is that it deprives courts of the authority to diminish
rights to challenge federal administrative action that courts had developed before 1946, including the right to judicial review of public lands
cases. Thus, though the APA did not waive sovereign immunity, it "took
providing relief to those injured by government action and keeping government within
the bounds of law, and judicial creativity in finding remedies in the absence of any statutory remedies - continually recurred.
Id. One can only surmise whether Professor Scalia would have subscribed to this analysis. I suspect
that he would not have gone so far as to openly admit to such judicial activism. It is clearer that
Justice Scalia today would chafe at the notion that judges should openly exercise their creativityinterstitially or not-to create or protect remedies against the government. Professor Siegel characterizes Justice Scalia as exemplary of "an unfortunate, retrograde period in which courts often seek
to disclaim their role in righting governmental wrongs." Id. at 1705 ("The opinions of some judges,
like Justice Scalia, frequently suggest that courts should be perfectly content to see a wrong go
unremedied."); id. at 1614 ("Today, many judges - most notably Justice Scalia-apparently seek to
abnegate the judicial role in creating remedies against the government."). Professor Siegel cites
Scalia's opinions in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 823 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) and Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 612-13 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), but the Justice's public lands opinions would suffice to support the same conclusion. See
infra Part II.
61.
Scalia, supra note 8, app. at 920-24 (entitled, Appendix: Concerning the Question
Whether the Administrative ProcedureAct is "Jurisdictional"in the Sense of Constitutinga Waiver
of Sovereign Immunity).
62. Id. at 922.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 923-24.
65.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 917.
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through subsequent

judicial revision of the principles of sovereign immunity," and possibly
"prevent[ed] [them] from raising any new obstacles to suit in the traditional fields of nonstatutory review ....
What the courts had granted
public lands plaintiffs before the APA, they could no longer taketh away
without further congressional action.67

C. Alternative Means to Sovereign Immunity for ProtectingExecutive
Discretion
Lest the reader begin to conclude that Scalia, in his early years,
sought to throw open the doors of federal courts for plaintiffs to challenge every exercise of public lands administration, there is a hitch. The
most telling of the important strands of thought in Scalia's Public-Lands
article is his view that courts should use alternative doctrines to sovereign immunity to preserve executive discretion. In particular, Scalia
highlights standing and mandamus principles.
The bulk of Conclusionsfrom the Pubic-Lands Cases traces what
Scalia regarded as the Supreme Court's erroneous application of sovereign immunity in a few public lands cases during the early twentieth century. According to Scalia, the Court's error was rooted in a mistaken
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as encompassing "domestic"
as well as "foreign" sovereign immunity. 68 The error was magnified by
the Court's conflation of sovereign immunity for states, on the one hand,
and the federal government, on the other. 69 The amenability of the federal government to suit in federal court, Scalia correctly argues, is a classic case of "domestic" sovereign immunity. 7° Finally, the wrongful application of sovereign immunity in the public lands cases, Scalia argues,
was compounded by the Court's own desire to protect its docket from a
feared onslaught of original jurisdiction cases.71
But the error of the Court's way is less significant, as a reflection of
Scalia's impact on public land law, than his analysis of its return to the
66. Id.
67. It is unclear whether Professor Scalia would also have argued that the APA's codification
of the existing law of judicial review would also prevent courts from exercising creativity to enhance, rather than diminish, the right to judicial review of cases in the "traditional fields of nonstatutory review" such as public lands. His analysis could be read to assume that the APA incorporated
nonstatutory review, wholly eliminating the ability of courts to change preexisting law in any way.
Professor Siegel, however, has convincingly shown that the APA neither eliminated nor subsumed
nonstatutory review and that nonstatutory review is available when the APA does not provide a
remedy and even when the plaintiff prefers nonstatutory review to an APA remedy. Siegel, supra
note 47, at 1665-68 (arguing that nothing in the text or in the discernible congressional intent could
be read to limit or exclude nonstatutory review). If the APA codified nonstatutory review as "existing law" but did not subsume it as part of an exclusive scheme, then courts would presumably still
be free to enhance the right of review through judicial revision.
68.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 887-88.
69.
Id. at 887.
70.
Id. at 887-88.
71.
See id. at 888.
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true path. Shortly after first using sovereign immunity to bar a public
lands case,72 the Court began to retreat, first in ordinary mandamus
cases73 and eventually in cases within the Court's original jurisdiction.74
The Court, of course, did not always grant relief in these cases. In a
number of cases in which the Court omitted to mention sovereign immunity or applied it as an alternative ground, it ruled against the plaintiff on
the basis of other doctrines that serve to protect federal officers' discretion in public lands administration. These doctrines, Scalia noted, included the by-then discredited "passage-of-title" theory 75 and, more importantly, the traditional elements of mandamus relief, particularly the
insistence that the writ can issue only to compel the exercise of "ministerial," as opposed to "discretionary" duties.7 6
Scalia's preference for other theories to preserve executive discretion is clearest in the final flourish of his sovereign immunity analysis.
Scalia cites Morrison v. Work77 as the last public lands case in which the
Supreme Court had sustained the defense of sovereign immunity.7 8 The
suit sought a mandatory injunction and other relief against various federal officials, including the Secretary of the Interior, regarding their duties under a statute governing the management and disposition of lands
ceded by the Chippewa Indians of Minnesota. 79 The Court, Scalia points
out, could easily have disposed of the case in one fell swoop by invoking
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.8 ° Indeed, that might have been the
expectation, given that the suit closely resembled Naganab, the high water mark for sovereign immunity in public lands cases. 8'
But, rather than merely rely on the case's likeness to Naganab, Justice Brandeis parsed the case into three different categories of claims.
The first set of claims alleged that the Congressional act authorizing the
challenged administrative acts was unlawful for failure to obtain the consent of the Chippewas. These claims, Brandeis wrote, were barred by

72. Scalia, supra note 8, at 895-96 (citing Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60, 70 (1906)
(noting that sovereign immunity was an alternative ground) and Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S.
473, 476 (1906), (noting that it was the only ground for the decision)).
73.
Id. at 898 (citing Garfield v. United States, ex rel Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249 (1908)).
74. Id. at 901-02 (citing Minnesota v. Lane, 247 U.S. 243 (1918)).
75.
The "passage-of-title" doctrine held that as long as legal title to public lands remained in
the United States--even if a claimant had established an equitable right to occupancy or the issuance
of a land patent-the Land Department (later the Department of the Interior) had sole jurisdiction to
the exclusion of courts. See, e.g., Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U.S. 473, 478 (1899). The doctrine,
though never explicitly overruled, was effectively repudiated by Land v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174, 182
(1917).
76. Scalia, supra note 8, at 898-902.
77.
266 U.S. 481 (1925).
78.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 903.
79. Morrison, 266 U.S. at 483-84.
80.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 906.
81.
Morrison involved the same statute as Naganaband, like the earlier case, was brought by
a Chippewa Indian on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. See id., at 903-04.
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sovereign immunity. 82 By overtly applying sovereign immunity to the

claims challenging the act of Congress, Scalia notes, Brandeis grudgingly followed Naganab, but only on the narrowest possible grounds.83
The importance of this limited application of sovereign immunity, ac-

cording to Scalia, was that the doctrine would retain vitality (at least in
public lands cases) only with respect to suits challenging legislative, not
executive, action. 84 According to Scalia, Brandeis's disposition of the

other claims in Morrison shows a better way to protect executive discretion.85
A second set of claims alleged that the officials sued had misconstrued or misapplied the statute. Brandeis's analysis of these claims had
two facets. The plaintiff could not maintain them because he "[wa]s not
in a position to litigate in this proceeding the legality of the acts complained of," having asserted a right that "resembles the general right of
every citizen to have the government administered according to law and
the public moneys properly applied., 86 But Brandeis played the sovereign immunity card as well, concluding his discussion of those claims by
again referring to the courts' lack of power "to interfere with the performance of the functions committed to an executive department... by 87a
suit to which the United States is not, and cannot be made, a party.,
Scalia construed Justice Brandeis's focus on the plaintiffs interest as an
attempt "to convert into 'lack of standing' much of what earlier cases
would have called 'sovereign immunity.',, 88 In Scalia's view, the reference to sovereign immunity was "Justice Brandeis' subtle way of implying that in the past the doctrine of sovereign immunity had often been
applied to secure ends which could be achieved more properly . . .
through the recently expanded principles of standing. 89
82.
Morrison, 266 U.S. at 485-86. As Scalia points out, Justice Brandeis applied a variant of
sovereign immunity based on his characterization of the United States as an "indispensable party"
which could not be joined as a defendant without its consent. Scalia, supra note 8, at 904 n. 174. As
Professor Siegel explains, the "indispensable parties" form of sovereign immunity stemmed from
courts' loss of focus on the fiction that enabled nonstatutory review in the first place, i.e., that a suit
against an officer was not really a suit against the United States. Siegel, supra note 47, at 1653-55.
83.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 906.
84. Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Morrison,266 U.S. at 486, 488.
87.
Id. at 488.
88.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 905 n.179. Scalia unsatisfactorily minimizes Brandeis's reliance
on sovereign immunity, noting that Brandeis wrote that the United States could not be joined "under
the circumstances here presented." Id. (quoting Morrison, 266 U.S. at 488). He fails to offer any
reason why the plaintiff's lack of a sufficient interest would enhance the applicability of sovereign
immunity. Id. Further, as Scalia admits, any lack of standing applicable to this set of claims would
be equally applicable to the others. Id. Despite Brandeis's discussion of the plaintiff's interest in the
proper administration of the trust-which, in any event, would put Indian allottees on a different
footing than beneficiaries of a private trust-it cannot be said that he based his analysis on standing
rather than sovereign immunity. See id
89. Id. at 905 n.179 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477, 488 (1923)) (emphasis
added). Scalia accepts that his reading of Morrisonand Brandeis's designs are not the only plausible
ones. Id. What is important here is that Scalia signals his own preference for the doctrine of standing
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The third set of claims sought a mandatory injunction to compel the
Secretary to dispose of lands in a particular way. The plaintiffs aim was
to enhance the value of the trust fund of which he and other Chippewa
Indians were beneficiaries. 90 As to these claims, Justice Brandeis, without mentioning sovereign immunity, held that a mandatory injunction is
an "exercise of sound judicial discretion" and was not warranted because
of insufficient equity. 91 Even here, Scalia emphasizes what he regards as
Justice Brandeis's standing overture.9 2
The purpose of this detail is not to saddle the reader-though it
might-but to highlight Scalia's obvious admiration for what he regarded as Justice Brandeis's deft reliance on alternative theories to sovereign immunity to protect the executive from judicial "interference."
Scalia regarded Morrison as more than an attempt to right the law by
limiting the applicability of sovereign immunity to public lands cases.
The opinion is better read
as an ambitious attempt to adjust the role of sovereign immunity in
all its applications so that it would be relied upon, when appropriate,
only to insulate the legislative branch from judicial interference. Under that interpretation, the protection of the executive branch would
be achieved by other devices, such as (1) the well-established ministerial-discretionary dichotomy... ; (2) the principle of standing...
perhaps expanded to cover many cases formerly disposed of on the
ground of sovereign immunity; and (3) a greater emphasis 93
upon the
"discretionary" character of mandamus and injunctive relief.
In this view, sovereign immunity was superfluous because other doctrines could insulate the executive from judicial meddling.
D. Scholars,Judges, and the Common Law
Before turning to Justice Scalia's implementation of these principles
in the public lands opinions he has authored, it is fitting to note his concluding comment on "the difficult role of the scholar in the common-law

to protect executive discretion against judicial intrusions-an early reflection of his view of standing
as promoting separation of powers he would later more fully develop. See Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrineof Standing as an EssentialElement of Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881

(1983) [hereinaftler Scalia, Doctrine ofStanding].
90.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 905.
91.
Morrison, 266 U.S. at 490.
92.
Scalia characterized this third holding as based, in part, on a finding that the plaintiff had
an "insufficient interest." Scalia, supra note 8, at 905. Justice Brandeis noted that Congress had
specifically provided for suits by Indians who vainly sought an allotment to which they were entitled. Id. But his point was not that the plaintiff was not himself a disappointed allotee. Id. Rather,
as a matter of equity, "it is not necessary to seek redress indirectly by this proceeding." Morrison,
266 U.S. at 490.
93.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 906-07. Scalia notes: "If that was the attempt, it certainly failed,
for Morrison has disappeared into the faceless crowd of inconsistent and irreconcilable cases on
sovereign immunity." Id.
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system., 94 If the common law system, he concludes, "is to make good
the boast that its legal rules are hammered out on the anvil of reality,
then the common-law scholar, unlike his civil-law counterpart, must derive his unifying principles from the case law instead of imposing them
upon it."'95 As a foil for this theme, Scalia recounts the failure of Larson
to establish a lasting and truly universal theory of sovereign immunity-

as evidenced by the continuing tradition of judicial review in public
lands cases. Scholars, "approaching the problem from the top rather than
the bottom, and seeking to follow out a principle rather than to adjudicate
a dispute," had missed the distinctiveness of public lands cases.96
Rather, they had lumped them together with the undifferentiated throngs
of cases "which happen to fall within the broad conceptual category" of
cases against federal officers seeking specific relief.97 In contrast, federal appellate courts adjudicating public lands cases, working from the
bottom, were not "misled" by Larson'sputative universality.98
Both Larson and Morrison, however, might be regarded as scholarly opinions in the sense that they approached the problem of sovereign
immunity from the top-down perspective that Scalia criticizes. Larson-

an opinion almost universally criticized by scholars, including Scaliasought to untangle and resolve conflict in the sovereign immunity doctrine by imposing a general rule that did not accord with the cases. 99 And
in Morrison Justice Brandeis, by Scalia's own reckoning, ambitiously

sought to adjust the law of sovereign immunity "in all its applications,"
limiting its applicability to challenges to legislative action while convert94. Id.at 918.
95. Id.
96.
Id. at 919.
97. Id.
98. Id. Scalia writes:
In fact, the tradition of judicial review of public-lands determinations would have continued even if the APA had not fortuitously been passed before, rather than after, Larson...
. The day in which the broad abstraction of Larson, however frequently affirmed, can suffice, APA or not, to destroy the vitality of a long line of cases, factually cohesive among
themselves and factually divergent from anything specifically considered in Larson itself-that day, surely, will be the morning after the twilight of the common-law. Until
then, it is not the historically consistent factual treatment, but rather the abstraction,
which will be twisted into compliance or, if necessary, ignored.
Id. at 918.
99.
Larson, 337 U.S. at 705. Justice Frankfurter began his dissent in Larson-an exegesis of
sovereign immunity case law-with the following admonition, somewhat at odds with Scalia:
Case-by-case adjudication gives to the judicial process the impact of actuality and
thereby saves it from the hazards of generalizations insufficiently nourished by experience. There is, however, an attendant weakness to a system that purports to pass merely
on what are deemed to be the particular circumstances of a case. Consciously or unconsciously the pronouncements in an opinion too often exceed the justification of the circumstances on which they re based, or, contrariwise, judicial preoccupation with the
claims of the immediate leads to a succession of ad hoc determinations making for eventual confusion and conflict. There comes a time when the general considerations underlying each specific situation must be exposed in order to bring the too unruly instances
into more fruitful harmony.
Id. at 705-06 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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ing the law of executive sovereign immunity into a law of standing. 0 0
Scalia intended his admonition to scholars to help buffer the pragmatic
development of the common law from the abstracting influence of scholars. Yet, at the climax of his analysis, he praises Justice Brandeis's judicial abstraction, his imposition of supposedly unifying principles of sovereign immunity, standing and mandamus.
II. JUSTICE SCALIA'S PUBLIC LANDS OPINIONS
As a young professor, Scalia noted: "What scholars represent as the
law has a tendency to become such. ..."'01 No doubt, he meant this as a
testament to the power the scholarly pulpit and the influence of scholarly
analysis on the courts. Unlike most scholars, however, Antonin Scalia
became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 1986.102 Justice
Scalia has participated in numerous decisions that, in some way, address
the public lands. He has written the opinion for the Court in two: Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation10 3 and Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance. °4 In these opinions, Justice Scalia has done what appears
to be a double pirouette, twice. In both cases he retreated from his respect, as a professor, for the tradition of judicial review in the existential
category of public lands cases. And in both cases he did so by imposing
his scholarly abstractions on the field ofjudicial review.
A. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation: Infusing Separationof Powers
Principlesinto Standing
1. The Opinion
In Lujan I, several national environmental groups brought suit under
the APA against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Secretary of the Interior to challenge "rampant" illegality in the administration
of the BLM's statutory land management responsibilities regarding land
withdrawals.' 0 5 By passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (FLPMA), 0 6 Congress directed the BLM to conduct various inventory and management planning activities for the 180 million acres under
its administration.107 These activities include inventorying the resource
and other values and classifying the lands for future uses in order to
achieve "multiple use" management l8 Among FLPMA's authorized
management tools are the reclassification of lands which had earlier been
designated for particular uses (sometimes to the exclusion of others) and
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Scalia, supra note 8,at, 905 n.179,906-07.
Scalia, supra note 8,at 919.
Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 3.
497 U.S. 871 (1990) (Lujan 1).
124 S.Ct.2373 (2004).
Lujan 1,497 U.S. at891.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1734a (1982).
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v.Burford (Burford]), 835 F.2d 305, 307-08 (D.C.Cir. 1987).
Lujan 1,497 U.S. at 877 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 171 l(a));
43 U.S.C. § 1712(a)).
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the power to "make, modify, extend or revoke" land withdrawals. 0 9 The
revocation of a withdrawal would typically have the effect of opening the
lands to potential mineral development."

0

The plaintiffs alleged that the

BLM's activities in relation to its "land withdrawal review program"
violated FLPMA, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and
the APA. "'

Whether because of the tradition of nonstatutory review or the
APA's 1976 amendment, sovereign immunity no longer bars such an
action, and the issue before the Court was standing-or, more particularly, the prudential aspect of standing. Specifically, the issue was
whether the plaintiffs were "adversely affected or aggrieved" by BLM's

actions as required by the APA's general provision for judicial review.12
In response to government motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, the National Wildlife Federation provided the affidavits of two
members who attested to using lands "in the vicinity" of the Arizona

Strip in northern Arizona and the South Pass-Green Mountain area of
Wyoming." 3 The parties agreed that the BLM had already terminated at
least one land withdrawal on the Arizona Strip and another in the area

referred to in the Wyoming affidavit.'

"4

Writing for five members of the

Court, Scalia found these affidavits insufficiently specific to withstand a

motion for summary judgment." 5
Had Scalia rested there, Lujan I might be regarded as little more
than a guide to the technical rules of standing, or even just summary
judgment." 6 But Scalia went on to address a bigger issue-one infused
109. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 877 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1712(d) (reclassification), § 1714(a) (withdrawals)).
110. Burfordl, 835 F.2d at 329. The term "withdrawal" is an artifact of the pre-FLPMA era in
which myriad laws provided for the disposal of federal lands by transfer of title or lesser property
interests to private parties. See Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 875. It refers to the withdrawal, or removal, of
designated lands from the normal operation of these laws, which included the mineral laws. Burford
1, 835 F.2d at 308. FLPMA, which reflected a shift in federal policy from disposal to retention of
public lands, repealed most of the disposal laws, but left in place those providing for mineral development. See Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 877 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1701).
111.
Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 875.
112. Id. at 885. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2005) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial review thereof.").
113. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 880, 886.
114.
Id. at 885-86.
Id. at 889. Scalia wrote:
115.
[W]here the fact in question is the one put in issue by the § 702 challenge here-whether
one of respondent's members has been, or is threatened to be, 'adversely affected or aggrieved' by Government action-Rule 56(e) is assuredly not satisfied by averments
which state only that one of respondent's members uses unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory, on some portions of which mining activity has occurred or
probably will occur by virtue of the governmental action. It will not do to 'presume' the
missing facts because without them the affidavits would not establish the injury that they
generally allege.
Id.
116.
Justice Scalia circulated his first draft opinion to the members of the Court on June 5,
1990. In response, Justice Stevens, who voted against the majority in conference and eventually
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with concern for the separation of powers. The plaintiffs could not rely
on additional affidavits-presumably not hampered by their nonspecificity-to establish standing because no affidavits could suffice to enable a
challenge to the "so-called 'land withdrawal review program."" 17 Scalia
characterized the problem as one of definition, but his concern was the
scope of judicial relief. The land withdrawal review program (to the
extent such a program existed), he said, comprised "1250 or so individual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations", 18 and was
"not an identifiable 'final agency action' for purposes of the APA." l 9
The real problem was that the plaintiffs had filed a "generic challenge to
all aspects" of the program and were thus inviting 20the courts to correct
"rampant" violations by public land administrators.
In language oozing with separation of powers concerns, Scalia
forcefully emphasized the limited role of the judiciary in reviewing and
remedying executive power. Even assuming the rampant illegality alleged, plaintiffs "cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by
court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of
21
Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made.'
Even when ripeness and standing would otherwise permit judicial intervention with respect to some part of a program, diffuse claims of illegality that address "the flaws in the entire 'program' ... cannot be laid before the courts for wholesale correction under the APA.', 122 Though he
acknowledges that Congress can provide for judicial "correction of the
administrative process at a higher level of generality," under the APA's
general right
of review "more sweeping actions are for the other
123

branches."'

joined the dissent, corresponded: "In this case I shall await further writing, particularly since, if I
understand your discussion in Parts III-C and V, this really is not a standing case any more." Memorandum from John Paul Stevens to Antonin Scalia (June 5, 1990), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN
PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library of Congress).
117. Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 890.
118. Id. (quoting the district court's opinion, Nat'l Fed'n of Wildlife v. Burford (Burford11),
699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D.D.C. 1988)).
119. Id. at 890 n.2.
120. Id. at 890 n.2, 891.
121.
Id. at 891.
122. Id. at 893.
123.
Id. at 894. There is a hint in the papers of Justice Blackmun that Scalia began with a
broader conceptual view focusing on separation of powers rather than the APA. Following the
pronouncement that the plaintiffs should seek programmatic improvement "in the offices of the
Department or the halls of Congress," Scalia initially drafted the following sentence: "In this third
branch of government, respondent must direct its attack against some particular 'agency action' that
causes it harm." 1st Draft, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, at 17 (June 5, 1990), in THE HARRY A.
BLACKMt PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library of Congress).
In the second draft, Justice Scalia subtly softened the separation of powers emphasis by changing the
words, "In this third branch of government" to "Under the terms of the APA." 2nd Draft, Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, at 17 (June 8, 1990), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court
File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library of Congress). This slight change could be read to
suggest that Scalia, though motivated by separation of powers concerns, gives expression to them
through his interpretation of the APA.
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As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, Scalia's discussion was
gratuitous.124 More important, it conflates jurisdiction and the scope of

relief. Scalia's discussion converts the issue of whether a court may issue programmatic relief to whether a plaintiff has a right of action under

the APA.1 25 There is no basis for a rule that a court cannot entertain an
action otherwise within its jurisdiction simply because it cannot issue the
full scope of relief sought by the plaintiff.

As an historical aside, Justice Scalia nearly failed to garner a majority of the Court for the portion of his opinion in which he voices these
separation of powers concerns. Justice O'Connor circulated to the Court
a draft concurrence joining in all parts of the opinion except Part IV-A.
Though she "agree[d] with the principles set forth in Part IV-A," she was
"less convinced than is the plurality that no 'land withdrawal review program' exists independently of the particular classification terminations
and withdrawal revocations."' 26 Justice O'Connor withdrew her draft
and joined Scalia's opinion "[i]n light of your changes in part IVA,"
which moderated (albeit subtly) the categorical denial that a "land withdrawal review program" existed. 27 It can be said that the desire to form
124.
Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Since the majority concludes in
other portions of its opinion that the Federation lacks standing to challenge any of the land-use
decisions at issue here, it is not clear to me why the Court engages in the hypothetical inquiry contained in Part IV-A.").
125.
See id. at 914-15.
126.
1st Draft, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, at 1 (June 22, 1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File,
1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library of Congress).
127.
Memorandum from Sandra Day O'Connor to Antonin Scalia (June 25, 1990) , in THE
HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library of
Congress). Justice Scalia had made two minute changes to Part IV-A in the draft he circulated to the
Court on June 25, the same day that O'Connor withdrew her concurrence. The first change was the
characterization that the District Court found the "'land withdrawal review program' extends to,
currently at least, [rather than "consists, currently at least, of'] '1250 or so individual classification
terminations and withdrawal revocations."' 4th Draft, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, at 16-17 (June
25, 1990), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89640 (Library of Congress). Compare 2d Draft, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, at 16 (June 8, 1990), in
THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library
of Congress). The second change was the insertion of the word "principally" in the following sentence:
But it is at least entirely certain that the flaws in the entire "program"--consisting principally of the many individual actions referenced in the complaint, and presumably actions
yet to be taken as well-cannot be laid before the courts for wholesale correction under
the APA, simply because one of them that is ripe for review adversely affects one of respondent's members.
4th Draft, at 18-19. Compare 2d Draft, at 18-19.
Moreover, in the next draft, Scalia added footnote 2 in response to Justice Blackmun's
dissent. Footnote 2 addresses Justice O'Connor's concerns more fully:
Contrary to the apparent understanding of the dissent, we do not contend that no 'land
withdrawal review program' exists, any more than we would contend that no weapons
procurement program exists. We merely assert that it is not an identifiable 'final agency
action' for purposes of the APA. If there is in fact some specific order or regulation, applying some particular measure across-the- board to all individual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations, and if that order or regulation is final, and has become
ripe for review in the manner we discuss subsequently in text, it can of course be challenged under the APA by a person adversely affected-and the entire 'land withdrawal
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a majority, as well as to respond to Justice Blackmun's dissent, nudged
Justice Scalia to moderate his expression of the limits of judicial review
of programmatic agency action.
2. The Scholarly Antecedents
That separation of powers concerns would motivate Justice Scalia's
standing jurisprudence should not have surprised anyone. Discussed
above is his reverence for Justice Brandeis's oblique use of standing in
Morrison v. Work. 128 Moreover, while a sitting judge on the D.C. Circuit, Scalia published a much-discussed essay arguing that standing was
an "essential element" of separation of powers.129 Scalia noted that separation of powers principles are found within the structure of the Constitution, and he directed much of his attention to constitutional aspects of
standing. 30 But he also criticized what he called "the Court's progressive elimination of the so-called 'prudential limitations' upon standing,"' 131 in particular, "the interpretation of the [APA] to
create liberalized
1 32
judicial review provisions where none existed before."
One front of attack was textual. The APA provides a right of judicial review to any "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by [such] action within the meaning of a relevant statute ....,33 According to Scalia, the "legal wrong"
criterion referred to "a wrong already cognizable in the courts-that is,
one as to which standing already existed pursuant to traditional principles."'134 By that he meant that the plaintiff had suffered some invasion
of a legal right, such as "one of property, one arising out of contract, one
protected against tortuous invasion, or one founded on a statute which
confers a privilege."' 135 The "adversely affected or aggrieved within the
meaning of a relevant statute" criterion, Scalia argued, was meant only to
encompass a right of review already provided by other statutes. 136 Under
this view, the APA merely codified the rules for judicial review existing
in 1946. The "legal wrong" criterion provided for judicial review of
review program,' insofar as the content of that particular action is concerned, would
thereby be affected. But that is quite different from permitting a generic challenge to all
aspects of the 'land withdrawal review program,' as though that itself constituted a final
agency action.
5th Draft, Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, at 17 n.2 (June 26, 1990), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN
PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 560, No. 89-640 (Library of Congress). See Lujan I,
497 U.S. at 890 n.2.
128.
266 U.S. 481 (1925). See discussion supra Parts I.C, I.D.
129.
Scalia, Doctrine of Standing, supra note 89.
130.
See id. at 881, 890-93.
131.
Id. at890.
132. Id.at887.
133.
5 U.S.C. § 702.
134.
Scalia, Doctrine of Standing, supra note 89, at 887.
135.
Id. at 887 n.28 (quoting Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137
(1939)).
136. Id. at 887-88.
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those cases for which "nontstatutory review" had been available; the
"adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action" criterion provided for
judicial review of cases for which "statutory" review had been available. 37 Scalia decried the broader view taken by the Court in the line of
cases interpreting the "adversely affected or aggrieved" criterion to require only that the plaintiff assert a harm within the "zone of interests"
Congress intended to protect in some substantive statute. 138
A second line of attack was functional. The judicial relaxation of
standing rules, according to Scalia, allowed courts "to address issues that
were previously considered beyond their ken," and to "address both new
and old issues promptly at the behest of almost anyone who has an interest in the outcome."' 139 The effect, to Scalia's chagrin, was the "emergence of the courts as an equal partner with the executive and legislative
branches in the formulation of public policy ...,,140 The more appropriate role for the courts--one that standing laws could work to restore-is,
in Scalia's view, "their traditional, undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority. ',14 1 Aggrieved
classes of individuals who resemble a majority, according to this view,
branches where democratic theory
must seek redress in the political
42
holds their power should prevail. 1
Justice Scalia's opinion in Lujan I is best seen as an initial attempt
to enshrine this view in law. It is clear that he wished to press his textual
arguments to limit APA review under the "adversely affected or ag43
grieved by agency action" prong but he was constrained by precedent.
The functional path, however, was open to him, particularly with Justice
O'Connor's joinder. Thus he was able to make a significant stride toId. at 888 n.31 (citing Scalia, supra note 8, at 870).
137.
138.
Id. at 888-89 (citing Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)
and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970)).
139.
Id. at 892-93.
140.
Id. at 893.
141.
Id. at 894.

142.
Scalia appears to realize that democratic theory might not bear out in practice. Yet he is
unmoved. In a provocative generalization that can be read to reflect animus toward the legislative
zeal to protect the environment, among other things. Scalia wrote:
Does what I have said mean that, so long as no minority interests are affected, 'important
legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, [can be] lost or misdirected in the
vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy?' Of course it does-and a good thing, too.
Where no peculiar harm to particular individuals or minorities is in question, lots of onceheralded programs ought to get lost or misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere....
The ability to lose or misdirect laws can be said to be one of the prime engines of social
change, and the prohibition against such carelessness is (believe it or not) profoundly
conservative. Sunday blue laws, for example, were widely unenforced long before they
were widely repealed-and had the first not been possible the second might never have
occurred.
Id. at 897 (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
143. Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990) ("We have long since rejected [the] interpretation ...
which would have made the judicial review provision of the APA no more than a restatement of preexisting law.").
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ward infusing standing doctrine-albeit only "prudential" standingwith separation of powers concerns. The effect, of course, was to embolden statutory standing as a means to insulate executive discretion
from judicial review.
B. Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance: ReinvigoratingTraditionalMandamus Restrictions
1. The Opinion
If Lujan I provided Scalia a vehicle for enhancing standing doctrine
as a means to protect executive discretion, Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) 144 did the same with respect to traditional mandamus restrictions on judicial review.1 45 As in Lujan I, environmental
groups sued under the APA to correct allegedly illegal administration of
the public lands by the BLM.146 The problem this time, rather than
"across the board" malfeasance challenged in Lujan I, was agency non147
feasance in the face of a plainly mandatory legislative command.
As already described, FLPMA-the organic statute at issue in Lulan
I--directed the BLM to inventory and classify lands under its administration. 148 Among the categories of lands FLPMA required the BLM to
identify was wilderness quality lands that would be suitable for protection under the Wilderness Act of 1964.149 Only Congress, however, can
designate lands for such wilderness protection. 150 Enlisting the work of
the BLM in the task of determining which lands to protect, Congress
directed the BLM to designate all lands with "wilderness characteristics"
as "Wilderness Study Areas" and, through further study, to determine
which of those would be "suitable" for designation as wilderness.' 5' Further, in order to preserve the congressional prerogative to designate wilderness in the future, FLPMA establishes a stringent management standard for all wilderness study areas: "[T]he Secretary shall continue to
manage such lands ...

in a manner so as not
to impair the suitability of
52

such areas for preservation as wilderness."'

SUWA brought suit to compel the BLM to comply with its nonimpairment mandate for WSAs and other requirements.1 53 It invoked the
APA's provision of a cause of action "to compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."' 154 It asked the Court to compel
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004).
See SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2380.
Id. at 2377-78.
Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 890 n.2. Cf SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2380.
SUWA, 124 S.Ct. at 2376.
Id.
43 U.S.C. § 1782(b) (2005).
43 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
43 U.S.C. § 1782(c).

153.
154.

SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2377-78.
Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2005).
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the BLM to comply with the nonimpairment mandate, to implement provisions in its land management plans relating to off-road vehicle (ORV)
use, and to prepare a supplemental EIS to analyze the effects of ORVs
where usage had
surpassed what was contemplated by the applicable
1 55
plans.
use
land
Writing for a unanimous Court, Scalia rejected the claims. As he
had infused the APA's right of review of final agency action with separation of powers principles in Lujan I, Scalia applied traditional mandamus
principles to limit the reach of the APA's right to review agency inaction. The first prong of his analysis concludes that only "discrete"
agency action is reviewable under the APA. 156 Though the APA includes
"failure to act" in its definition of "agency action, ' '1 57 the result is
achieved by the construction of "failure to act" as the mirror image of the
explicit exemplars of affirmative agency action, which Scalia reads as
"circumscribed, discrete agency actions."' 58 Thus, the "failure to act" is
reviewable only if it is "a failure to take ' one
of the agency actions (in59
cluding their equivalents) earlier defined."'
Moreover, according to SUWA, even where the agency action at issue is discrete, the APA empowers a court to compel it only if it is "legally required.' 160 The limitation derives from Scalia's view that the
APA "carried forward the traditional practice prior to its passage, when
judicial review was achieved through use of the so-called prerogative
161
writs-principally the writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act."'
Thus, not only must the action sought to be compelled be a "specific,
unequivocal command,"' 162 but it also must be one "about which [an official] has no discretion whatever."' 163 Courts may compel "ministerial"
duties if they are sufficiently clear, but not "discretionary" ones no matter how clear.
The extent to which Scalia's view rigidly and formally separates the
judicial and executive roles, particularly in the area of public land law, is
evident from his treatment of the specific mandates at issue in SUWA.
FLPMA's statutory nonimpairment standard is "mandatory as to the object to be achieved," but courts may not remedy its violation, in the face

155.

SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2378.

156.
157.

Id. at 2379.
The APA provides: "'Agency action' includes the whole or part of an agency rule, order,

license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act."

5 U.S.C. § 551(13)

(2005).
158. SUWA, 124 S.Ct.at 2378.
159. Id. at 2379.
160. Id.
161.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 165 1(a) (2005)).
162. Id. (citing Interstate Commerce Comm'n. v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 287 U.S.
178, 204 (1932).).
163. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 46 (1888) (quoting Kendall
v. United States ex relStokes, 37 U.S. 524, 613 (1838))).
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of agency nonfeasance, because the statute leaves the BLM "a great deal
of discretion in deciding how to achieve it."' 64 Scalia meets the claim
that ORVs should be eliminated entirely in WSAs by finding no clear
legal mandate to do so.' 65 To meet the argument that that FLPMA mandates some kind of regulation, even if not total exclusion, Scalia falls
back on the rigidly constructed "discrete agency action" prong. 166 He
rejects the notion that a court, upon finding that wilderness values are
being impaired, should order the BLM to do something, even if leaving
to the agency just what to do (presumably, for later review by the
court). 167 Rather, he concludes that "[g]eneral deficiencies
in compliance
' 168
... lack the specificity requisite for agency action."
By this reckoning, the discretion how to achieve the object (i.e.,
nonimpairment) becomes discretion not to achieve it-at least, so far as a
court is concerned:
If courts were empowered to enter general orders compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates, they would necessarily be empowered, as well, to determine whether compliance was achievedwhich would mean that it would ultimately become the task of the
supervising court, rather than the agency, to work out compliance
with the broad statutory
mandate, injecting the judge into day-to-day
69
agency management. 1
Implicit in this view is that the evil of judicial oversight of executive
discretion outweighs the evil of Congress's delegate, the administrative
officer, failing to act toward accomplishing an admittedly mandatory
objective. The hyperbolic concern for executive discretion permits the
executive to subvert Congress's clear intent to maintain wildernessquality lands unimpaired in order to ensure the possibility of their permanent protection.
Scalia's treatment of the plaintiffs' claims based on BLM's own
land use plans show that, in his zeal to protect executive discretion from
judicial oversight, he would even shield it from the binding exercise of
executive discretion itself. FLPMA employs the two-tiered management
structure common to all federal land; it directs BLM to prepare comprehensive land and resources management plans and to implement them
largely through later, individualized management decisions. 70 Such
individual decisions must be made "in accordance with," and "conform
to," the terms of the land use plan.17' The plaintiffs sought to enforce
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 2380.
Id.
Id. at 2381.
Id. at 2380-82.
Id. at 2381.
Id.
43 U.S.C. § 1712(a), (e) (2005).
SUWA, 124 U.S. at 2381; 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2005); 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3(a) (2005).
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ostensible commitments in a BLM plan to monitor ORV use and ban it if
warranted.17 2 Rather than find this commitment too discretionary or unclear to be enforced-as he did FLPMA's nonimpairment mandateScalia reasoned that the commitment was nonbinding because "a land
use plan is generally a statement of priorities" which "guides and con73
strains actions, but does not (at least in the usual case) prescribe them.'
According to Scalia's somewhat circular reasoning, judicial enforcement
of such an executive statement of priorities "would lead to pervasive
interference with BLM's own ordering of priorities"' 74 because all executive commitments are
subject to competing budgetary demands and
75

appropriation of funds.

In sum, by relying on the traditional elements of mandamus as a
limit to the right to judicial review of agency nonfeasance under the
APA, SUWA adds a new face to Scalia's construction of the APA as protecting executive discretion, particularly from judicial oversight. Indeed,
Scalia views his interpretation as closing the backdoor to the kind of

"broad, programmatic challenge" he stopped at the front in Lujan I. The
Lujan I plaintiffs, he reasoned, would not have succeeded had they cast
the BLM's conduct of the "land withdrawal review program" as a "failure to revise land use plans in proper fashion" or "failure to consider
multiple use."' 176 Like the rule of statutory standing in Lujan I, the man-

damus-based view of the APA's right of review to compel agency action
serves "to protect agencies from undue judicial interference with their
lawful discretion, and to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy
disagreements
which courts lack both expertise and information to re77
solve."'

1

2. The Anomalous Disappearance of the Equity Tradition in Mandatory Relief
Justice Scalia's reinvigoration of mandamus principles as limits on
the APA cause of action to challenge agency inaction may have been
172. SUWA, 124 S.Ct. at2382.
173. Id. at 2383. SUWA does not render nugatory FLPMA's provision that management must
be "in accordance with" and "conform to" land use plans, but it comes close. Scalia admits that final
agency actions implementing a plan may be set aside as "arbitrary and capricious" under the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2) if they are inconsistent with a plan. Id. at 2380 n.2, 2382. He further acknowledges
courts may compel action promised in a land use plans if the plan merely reiterates "duties the
agency is already obligated to perform." Id. at 2384. By this, he must mean only nondiscretionary,
ministerial duties imposed by statute, for he stops short of endorsing a view that agency-promulgated
commitments may be enforced under § 706(1); see id.at 2384 ("Of course an action called for in a
plan may be compelled when the plan merely reiterates duties the agency is already obligated to
perform, or perhaps when language in the plan itself creates a commitment binding on the agency.")
(emphasis added); "We express no view as to whether a court could, under § 706(1), enforce a duty
to monitor ORV use imposed by a BLM regulation." Id.at 2384 n.5.
174. Id.at 2384.
175.
Id.at 2383.
176. Id.at 2380.
177. Id.at2381.
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foretold by his scholarly analysis of Justice Brandeis's opinion in Morrison v. Work. The so-called "well established ministerial-discretionary
dichotomy" is now an essential part of the analysis whether agency inaction is subject to review under § 706(1).178 But, as "well established" as
Scalia regards it, the universal application of the ministerial-discretion
distinction to limit the availability of mandatory relief-the basis on
which he denied judicial review in SUWA-is an historical anomaly, and
an unworkable one to boot. 179 Although his attack on sovereign immunity was part of a chorus of administrative law scholars in the 1960s and
1970s, his reliance then and now on the "ministerial-discretionary dichotomy" is discordant and historically wrong. It reflects the unfortunate
swallowing of the equitable remedy of the mandatory injunction by the
hypertechnical law governing traditional writs of mandamus.
Like the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the common law of mandatory relief against government officials had become woefully muddled
by the mid-twentieth century. Scholarly criticism of legal developments
in this area' 8 0 -like that of sovereign immunity-led to statutory reform' 81 and might understandably be overlooked by those who do not
bear history in mind. A review of that history and the scholarly criticism
shows the error of Scalia's reliance on the traditional law of mandamus.
The writ of mandamus, an ancient legal remedy, is one form of
mandatory relief. 82 According to scholarly critics, notably Professors
Davis and Byse, American mandamus law suffered from several crippling technicalities. First, Supreme Court precedent held that courts of
the District of Columbia had jurisdiction to issue a writ, 183 but federal

178.
Scalia, supra note 8, at 907.
179.
Justice Scalia is a student of historical anomalies in the law. In a 1985 lecture to the
Supreme Court Historical Society, he unraveled two anomalous developments in administrative law.
See Antonin Scalia, HistoricalAnomalies in Administrative Law, SUP. CT. Y.B., 1985, at 103, available at http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04 library/subsvolumes/04 c19_i.html. One anomaly,
discussed supra in Part I, was the creation of the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity by means of
its equation with state sovereign immunity. Id. at 104-06. Scalia expressed regret about the result
of that anomaly, namely, that it amounted to "an irrational impediment to judicial review," though he
hastened to add that his objection was to the irrationality, not the impediment. Id. at 106.
180.
E.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Mandatory Relieffrom Administrative Action in the Federal
Courts, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 585 (1955); Clark Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory"
Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, IndispensableParties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1479
(1962); Clark Byse & Joseph V. Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
"Nonstatutory" JudicialReview ofFederalAdministrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1967).
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, § 2, 76 Stat. 744 (1962) (codified
181.
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e)(2005)).
182.
Its history in the United States is no less venerable than Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), in which Marbury sought a writ of mandamus for Madison to deliver his commission as a justice of the peace. The technicalities that eventually confounded the whole of mandamus law were evident in that seminal case. Though Justice Marshall found that the delivery of the
commission was a ministerial, rather than executive, duty which could be a proper subject of the
writ, Madison's petition ultimately failed because it invoked the Court's original, rather than appellate, jurisdiction.
183.
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 616-17 (1838).
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district courts outside the District of Columbia did not. 184 As a result,
courts issued a series of conflicting opinions about when mandamus relief was available to compel a federal officer (often a resident of the District of Columbia, but sometimes not) to perform a mandatory duty, rendering the strategy of pursuing
the writ to correct government unlawful185
ness an uncertain one at best.
A second confounding technicality, according to the mandamus
scholarship-and a more important one for purposes here-was that the
traditional writ of mandamus could compel ministerial, but not discretionary, duties. The core problem with the ministerial-discretionary distinction is that it is so fraught with definitional difficulties as to be essentially unworkable; applying the distinction requires the judge to categorize the duty as one type or the other when, in many instances, the distinction often is unclear or inapt. 186 As Byse and Fiocca noted, "the dichotomy is largely illusory because there are few federal administrative
determinations that do not involve an element of discretion and few that
are wholly discretionary."' 87 For example, some duties, like FLPMA's
nonimpairment duty, involve a categorical imperative to achieve an ob88
jective but also afford discretion as to the exact means to achieve it.'
Other statutory duties become "clear" or "ministerial" only after an act of
interpretation that itself involves the exercise of judgment and discretion.189 In such cases, orthodox application of the distinction-i.e., one
that finds no mandamus jurisdiction whenever the duty involves a scintilla of discretion-would lead courts to deny relief even when the result
would contravene plain statutory purposes. 90 Thus, the ministerialdiscretionary distinction encourages courts "to avoid the difficult task of
determining the scope of the delegated power or discretion ....

[r]ather

than study[] the applicable statute, its legislative history, administrative
practice under the statute, and utiliz[e] all other relevant aids to determine the scope of the discretion."' 19' The unfortunate result is the unjust

denial of judicial review of some administrative actions that are plainly
outside the permissible scope of discretion.
184.
M'Intyre v. Wood, 5 U.S. 504, 505 (1813).
185.
Davis, supra note 180, at 585.
186. See Byse, supra note 180, at 1509; Byse & Fiocca, supranote 180, at 333.
187.
Byse & Fiocca, supra note 180, at 333.
188.
SUWA, 124 S.Ct. at 2380.
189.
See Davis, supra note 180, at 598-99; Jaffe, supra note 53, at 426-27.
190.
Both Professors Davis and Jaffe argued that the Supreme Court did not so rigidly apply
the ministerial-discretionary distinction. In Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221 (1900), for example, the Court allowed mandamus review notwithstanding a question of statutory interpretation,
leading Jaffe to conclude that "the alleged discretion of the officer ... will not protect him from
mandamus if the court is convinced that his ruling was erroneous as a matter of law." Jaffe, supra
note 53, at 427. Davis went even further, concluding that the Court overruled the ministerialdiscretionary distinction, sub silentio, by affording relief in Robertson v. Chambers, 341 U.S. 37
(1951), a case brought "in the nature of mandamus" under the APA which involved "a difficult
problem of statutory interpretation of the kind that is about as far removed from the 'ministerial' as
any discretionary function may be." Davis, supra note 180, at 606.
191.
Byse & Fiocca, supra note 180, at 334.
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Another problem with the ministerial-discretionary distinction, as
Professor Davis argued, is that it is founded on an anachronistic understanding of judicial review--one that views the choice as between de
novo judicial review and none at all.192 Such a distinction made some
sense in the most traditional, formal view of the writ, which was conceived as an action by the sovereign, through a "relator,' 93 against its
officer to compel a duty the officer is legally obligated to perform. Judicial compulsion of merely ministerial duties, about whose existence there
was no interpretive discretion, could not infringe on the discretion of the
sovereign. But, as Professor Davis argued, in the modem context the
distinction needlessly conflates the distinct and separate issues of
whether judicial review is available as a threshold matter and the scope
of review when it is.' 9 4 In the modem administrative state, where there
are a range of available scopes of judicial review, including the "arbitrary
the sovereign can be protected
and capricious" standard, the discretion of95
by applying a deferential scope of review.'
The alternative approach to mandatory relief was the mandatory injunction, which developed in the equity tradition. Unlike the writ of
mandamus, the mandatory injunction was not hampered by unworkable
and, in some cases, unjust technicalities. Rather, it was the affirmative
manifestation of the traditional writ of injunction, which Story summarized in 1836 as "a judicial process, whereby a party is required to do a
particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, according to
the exigency of the writ."' 196 Under the principles of equity, courts could
issue mandatory injunctions when "from the standpoint of doing justice it
was proper in the circumstances."' 97 Among the benefits of the equity
tradition of mandatory relief, according to Professor Davis, were its focus on the substantive merits of claims "without interruption from procedural discord" and the fact that equity "does not make availability or
distincscope of review dependent upon an undesirable and
198 unworkable
tion between ministerial and discretionary action."
Despite its superiority as a form of mandatory relief from administrative unlawfulness, the tradition of the mandatory injunction had fallen
into disuse long before SUWA. But the application of writ of mandamus
technicalities to all actions seeking mandatory relief against the government is largely the result of a historical accident that has never been
192.
Davis, supra note 180, at 601.
193.
A "relator" is: "An informer. The person upon whose complaint, or at whose instance
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1289 (6th ed. 1990).
certain [traditional] writs [were] issued ....
194.
Id. at 597.
195. See id. at 601 ("Today we know that our choice is not limited to de novo review or no
review.").
196.
2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 861, at 154 (Cambridge
Press 1836), quoted in Davis, supra note 180, at 589.
197.
Davis, supra note 180, at 591.
Id. at 608-09.
198.
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properly rectified. Professor Davis traces the initial fading of the mandatory injunction tradition to the 1934 case of Miguel v. McCarl.199 In that
case, although the plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction rather than a
writ of mandamus, the Court, without explanation or discussion equated
the forms of relief and applied mandamus technicalities.2 ° ° Professors
Byse and Fiocca urged that the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 be
interpreted to eliminate the ministerial-discretionary distinction but foresaw that a late-hour amendment to the legislation would allow its continued vitality,20 1 particularly if "a busy judge [was] ... misled by a superficial reading of quotations ... from some of the older Supreme Court
opinions in mandamus cases. 20 2 They also argued that, even if the ministerial-discretionary distinction were not entirely purged, it could accommodate equitable principles if judges applied it to curtail administrative action beyond the permissible range of discretion, even if the official
action involved some level of discretion.2 3
Despite its disuse, the equitable approach to mandatory relief has
never been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court as a mode of judicial
review of federal administrative action. Until SUWA, the Court had been
silent as to the exact nature of actions for mandatory relief under the
APA. Professor Davis believed in 1955 that the Supreme Court was
heading toward an interpretation of the APA that would finally jettison
mandamus -technicalities in favor of the equity tradition of mandatory
injunctions. He urged the Supreme Court to "explain that the Administrative Procedure Act has abolished mandamus intricacies, that equity
tradition prevails, and that in the future nothing will hinge on the unworkable and harmful distinction between ministerial and discretionary

199. 291 U.S. 442 (1934); see Davis, supra note 180, at 597.
200. Miguel, 291 U.S. at 452 (stating "[tihe mandatory injunction here prayed for is in effect
equivalent to a writ of mandamus, and governed by like considerations," citing Warner Valley Stock
Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28, 31, 33 (1897)).
201.
28 U.S.C. § 1361 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any

action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Professor Byse, an architect of the 1962
legislation, argued forcefully that equity, rather than traditional mandamus, principles should thenceforth govern mandatory relief against government officials. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 180, at 33136. Nonetheless, he foresaw that the insertion of the words "in the nature of mandamus" at the
insistence of the Justice Department late in the legislative process-could lead a resurgence of the

ministerial-discretionary distinction and other mandamus technicalities. Id. at 353-54.
202. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 180, at 353.
203. See id.
at 334-35. Byse & Fiocca preferred the mode of analysis sketched by Chief Justice Taft in Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1925):
Mandamus issues to compel an officer to perform a purely ministerial duty. It cannot be

used to compel or control a duty in the discharge of which by law he is given discretion.
The duty may be discretionary within limits. He cannot transgress those limits, and if he
does so, he may be controlled by injunction or mandamus to keep within them. The
power of the court to intervene, if at all, thus depends upon what statutory discretion he

has .... [The] extent [of the officer's discretion] and the scope ofjudicial action in limiting it depend upon a proper interpretation of the particular statute and the congressional
purpose.

Id.at 335.
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action."2 °4 The 1951 decision in Robertson v. Chambers,2 °5 which arose
under the APA, had been "completely inconsistent with the mandamus
tradition and... [could] best be explained on the ground that all the intricacies of mandamus are superceded by the APA-or by a mixture of
the APA and common sense. 20 6 Yet, with citations to a few older Supreme Court opinions in mandamus cases, 20 7 Justice Scalia has done the
opposite. He has ensured the perpetuation of the anomaly and the ultimate ascendance of the harmful and unwise ministerial-discretionary
distinction.
III. FOOTSTEPS AND REFORMATIONS
Justice Scalia's footprints on the public lands led in 1970 to the
door of the federal courthouse. Today they lead away from it. The discussion thus far has focused on the push and pull of doctrine on Scalia's
compass. But there is another view of the landscape on which he has
tread. That view is framed by the identities of the participants in the
administrative process and the ends toward which they invoke the third
branch. Bowdoin and Tallman, whose cases first piqued Scalia's interest
in sovereign immunity and the public lands, called upon the courts to
vindicate traditional private property rights or their statutorily-created
equivalent. 20 8 The National Wildlife Federation and the Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, whose cases he turned away from the courthouse
door, asked the courts to vindicate statutorily-enshrined public values.20 9
At the time Scalia wrote Conclusionsfrom the Public-Lands Cases,
the presence of groups like NWF and SUWA as plaintiffs in lawsuits
seeking to affect national or regional policy was a nascent phenomenon.2 1 Within a few years, however, Professor Richard Stewart recog' '21
nized that administrative law was in the midst of a "reformation. 1
That reformation sought to place the public beneficiaries of administrative action on a more equal footing with traditional, private interests,
both within the administrative process and in judicial review. 212 It its

broad contours, the reformation would be consistent with providing judi204.
Davis, supra note 180, at 607-08.
205.
341 U.S. 37 (1951).
206.
Davis, supra note 180, at 605.
207.
See SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2379 (citing ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 287 U.S. 178,
204 (1932), ICC v. United States ex rel. Humbolt S. S. Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912), and United States
ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 46 (1888) (quoting Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37

U.S. 524 (1838))).
208.
See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
209. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n (Lujan I), 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Norton v. S. Utah
Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2373, 2373-2385 (2004).
210.
The Sierra Club filed its famous suit seeking to stop the development of a Disney ski area
in Mineral King Valley, California, in June 1969. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)
(establishing that aesthetic injury is a sufficient basis for standing in environmental cases); see
Oliver A. Houck, Unfinished Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 867,909-21 (2002).
211.
Stewart, supra note 14.
212. Id. at 1712, 1716.

2005]

SCALIA'S FOOTPRINTS ON THE PUBLIC LANDS

291

cial review for Bowdoin, Tallman, NWF and SUWA alike. Justice
Scalia's denial of judicial review in Lujan I and SUWA cuts across this
grain. 213
A. The JudicialReformation ofAdministrative Law
Professor Stewart described a reformation driven by a need to buttress the eroding theoretical foundations of administrative law. What
Stewart called the "traditional" model of administrative law developed in
the context of emerging regulatory agencies in the late nineteenth century. Agencies like the Interstate Commerce Commission, for the first
time, exercised administrative control over private business conduct.2 14
As Stewart described, the doctrines of the traditional model sought to
"reconcile the new assertions of governmental power with a longstanding solicitude for private liberties by means of controls that served
both to limit and to legitimate such power., 215 In the aggregate, the doctrines Stewart associated with the traditional model viewed the regulatory agency as "a mere transmission belt for implementing legislative
directives in particular cases. 2 16 The traditional model thus legitimated
"intrusions into private liberties by agency officials not subject to electoral control by ensuring that such intrusions [were] commanded by a
legitimate source of authority - the legislature." 217 The courts' role in
such a model is one of formal containment of agencies within congressional directives in order to protect private autonomy.
With the vast expansion of agency powers during the New Deal, the
faults with the traditional model became clear. The traditional model
worked to legitimize administrative power as long as Congress provided
directives were narrowly drawn, but it failed to justify the exercise of
power under schemes that broadly delegated discretion.218 Expertise
became the new legitimizing tenet. The agency's role was thus reconceived as that of a "manager or planner with an ascertainable goal," and
discretion was seen as necessary to their successful discharge of their
broad and ambitious responsibilities. 219 The judicial role under the "expertise" model became one of imposing procedural safeguards and applying procedurally-oriented scope of review doctrines to ensure agency
fidelity to congressional goals.22 °

213. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Nature of Environmental Law and the U.S. Supreme Court,
35 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10503, 10515 (August 2005).
214. See Stewart, supranote 14, at 1671.
215. Id.at1671-72.
216. Id.at 1675.
217. Id.
Id.at 1676-77.
218.
Id.at 1678.
219.

220. See id. at 1679-81 (describing the emergence of the requirements of substantial evidence
to support agency factfinding, reasoned consistency in decisionmaking, and clear statement of legislative intent to regulate fundamental individual liberties).
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As surely as the traditional model teetered, so did the expertise
model. Faith that agency expertise would yield decisions in the public
interest soon withered. As Stewart explains, "[t]o the extent that belief in
an objective "public interest" remains, the agencies are accused of sub22
verting it in favor of the private interests of regulated and client firMs." l
In this view, agency decisions could be explained as a product not of
expertise, but of an "essentially legislative process of adjusting the com222
peting claims of various private interests affected by agency policy.
The victors of this "essentially legislative" game, predictably, were organized, well-funded interests-such as the regulated or client industries-and their policy victories came "at the expense of diffuse, comparatively unorganized interests such as consumers, environmentalists,
and the poor., 223 The result was systematic agency bias in favor of regulated entities.224
The "reformation" of administrative law, as described by Stewart,
was a judicially-driven effort to ground the legitimacy of the "essentially
legislative" administrative state in the capability of its procedural law to
afford adequate representation for all affected interests.22 5 Rules governing judicial review contributed significantly to agency bias. Because
only entities subject to sanction by the agency traditionally had the
power to invoke formal procedures or seek judicial review, "these groups
[were] ensured a forum in which they can force the agency to respond to
their views.' 226 To counter this structural imbalance,
courts have changed the focus of judicial review (in the process expanding and transforming traditional procedural devices) so that its
dominant purpose is no longer the prevention of unauthorized intrusions on private autonomy, but the assurance of fair representation

221.
Id. at 1682-83. Stewart further explains:
[W]e have come not only to question the agencies' ability to protect the "public interest,"
but to doubt the very existence of an ascertainable "national welfare" as a meaningful
guide to administrative decision. Exposure on the one hand to the complexities of a managed economy in a welfare state, and on the other to the corrosive seduction of welfare
economics and pluralist political analysis, has sapped faith in the existence of an objective basis for social choice.
Id. at 1683.
222.
Id. at 1683.
223.
Id. at 1684-85.
224.
Stewart goads the public choice critics as speaking with a "dogmatic tone that reflects
settled opinion," but he does not quarrel fundamentally with their conclusion. Id. at 1684. He offers, however, a more nuanced version of the reasons for unbalanced agency responsiveness to
regulated industries than simple agency capture. Contributing to the problem, he argued, were the
inherently weak position of agency regulators whose power is "essentially negative"; the entrylimiting aspects of an entrenched regulatory system; the comparatively scarce resources of regulatory agencies compared with regulated industries; and agencies' dependence on information controlled by regulated entities and other organized groups. Id. at 1685-86.
225.
Id. at 1683.
226.
ld.at 1713.
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for all affected interests
in the exercise of the legislative power dele227
gated to agencies.
In short, the reformation sought to legitimize administrative law by placing the beneficiaries of administrative action, such as consumers of
products and users of the environment, on an equal footing with the regulated industries, such as manufacturers and polluters. If all interest
groups were adequately represented in the administrative process, the
exercise of agency authority would be supported by democratic theory.
The judicial reformation thus expanded the rights of regulatory beneficiaries in agency proceedings by expanding notions of due process and the
protections of formal procedures.2 28 On the judicial front, the reformation established "an increasingly strong presumption of judicial review of
agency action (or inaction)" and enlarged 2"the
class of interests entitled
29
to obtain judicial review of agency action.
Professor Stewart, to be sure, was a skeptic of the reformation. His
fundamental critique of the "interest representation" model was that it
could not restore the shaken legitimacy of administrative law because the
judicial reforms would not actually ensure adequate representation of all
relevant interests. 230 But notwithstanding its theoretical flaws and ramifications, the reformation has certainly been a success from a pragmatic,
instrumental perspective. That is to say, it has spawned a generation of
administrative and judicial litigation by public beneficiaries of statutory
programs-as private attorneys general-that has forced agencies to be
accountable to a broader set of affected interests. 23 1 Even if this development falls short of Stewart's theoretical goals, as Professor Shapiro
notes, "pragmatism...
does not permit the perfect to become the enemy
23 2
of the good.,

227.
Id. at 1712. Stewart also described the reformation as follows:
[A]dministrative law is no longer limited to the protection of a small class of private lib-

erty and property interests against unauthorized governmental intrusions, but has assumed far more ambitious responsibilities. During the process of expansion the operation
of the traditional model has itself been transformed thereby creating a possible solution to
the problem of imbalance in representation in the exercise of agency discretion.

Id. at 1716.
228. ld.at 1716.
229.

Id.

230.

See id. at 1763; see Sidney Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL

SCHOLARSHIP: THE REFORMATION OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Art. 1 at 10-18 (2005),

http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/artl (summarizing what he terms the "counterreformation" spawned
by Stewart's critique) [hereinafter Shapiro, PragmaticAdmin. Law]; see also Sidney A. Shapiro,
Administrative Law after the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48
U. KAN. L. REV. 689 (2000) [hereinafter Shapiro, Counter-Reformation].
231.
Shapiro, PragmaticAdmin. Law, supra note 229, at 6-7 (listing recent environmental
cases); Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits to Enforce NondiscretionaryDuties, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 353,392 (2004).
232. Shapiro, PragmaticAdmin. Law, supra note 229, at 7.
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B. The Nonreformation of Scalia
Justice Scalia is Catholic, 233 but he might well invoke a phrase from
a famous Shaker song: "To turn, turn will be our delight 'Till by turning,
turning we come round right., 234 There is no inconsistency in his opening the courthouse to public lands plaintiffs in 1970 and shutting it to
public lands plaintiffs in the 1990s and beyond. His view of the judicial
role is consistent through the decades. He views courts as a proper venue
for vindicating private rights against intrusion by governmental authority
and an improper venue for the vindication of public values against governmental neglect or mismanagement.
As discussed already,235 Scalia's belief in the limited function of
courts is grounded in the assumption that the democratic process functions to effectuate the will of the majority through the political branches
and that courts are needed only to protect minority rights against intrusion by the majoritarian exercise of governmental authority.236 Traditional private rights and their equivalents are, by virtue of their private
nature, minority rights. The kinds of public values that drive many environmental plaintiffs and other private attorneys general to seek judicial
review, by Scalia's reckoning, are expressions of a majoritarian politics,
and the failure of agencies to realize them a majoritarian harm.2 37 But
even Scalia recognized that democracy does not always run true to the
premises on which it is based; he admits that "[i]t may well be ... that
democracy simply
does not permit the genuine desires of the people to be
238
given effect.,
Given his reliance on democratic theory and the separation of powers, it is debatable whether Scalia's view of the judicial role-as it has
played out in Lujan I and SUWA-is motivated by the desire to counterreform administrative law. But his interpretation of standing and mandamus principles plainly has that effect. 239 Scalia himself recognized
that his reconception of standing would always afford judicial review for
"an individual who is the very object of a law's requirement or prohibition. ,24 0 And he contrasted that with the "increasingly frequent administrative law cases in which the plaintiff is complaining of an agency's
233.

See George Kannar, The ConstitutionalCatechism ofAntonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297

(1990) (analyzing how Justice Scalia's Catholicism affects his jurisprudence).
234.
Edward D. Andrews, Simple Gifts, in THE GIFT TO BE SIMPLE:
RITUALS OF THE AMERICAN SHAKERS 136 (1962).

SONGS, DANCES AND

235.
See supra Part II.A.2.
236.
Scalia, Doctrineof Standing, supra note 89, at 896 ("It is hard to believe that the democratic process, if it works at all, could not and should not [be] relied on to protect the interests of [an]
almost all-inclusive group.").
237. See id. at 894.
238.
Id. at 897.
239.
See Shapiro, Counter-Reformation, supra note 229, at 719 ("Thus, the effect, if not the
intent, is to roll back standing doctrine to its status before the reformation, when regulatory beneficiaries generally were not able to sue.").
240.
Scalia, Doctrine of Standing,supra note 89, at 894.
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unlawful failure to impose a requirement or prohibition on someone
else."241 The majoritarian harm in the latter case, in his view, deserves
no vindication in the courts. Bowdoin and Tallman, asserting that interference with their private property rights, may obtain review, while NWF
and SUWA must rely on the political branches, not the courts, to correct
the BLM's failure to effectuate public values.
C. The Congressional "Reformation" of Public Land Law
It is tempting to think of public land law as a shining example of the
reformation of administrative law. In the days before FLPMA and similar laws mandating the retention and management of public lands, the
typical plaintiff in a public lands case resembled the object of government regulation, whose private autonomy the traditional model of administrative law sought to protect. The reason for that is that the disposition
of the public domain was a dominant goal of public land policy, and
Congress sought to accomplish that goal by privatizing public natural
resources.242 In many instances, fee title in public land was transferred to
private parties under the terms of statutory grants. In other instances,
less-than-fee private interests in public lands were authorized by statute.
The administration of public land statutes by the Secretary of the Interior
and the General Land Office involved the exercise of authority over private claimants to ensure that the transfer or creation of property interests
conformed with statutory terms. In seeking judicial intervention, disappointed or frustrated claimants thus asserted what looked like traditional
private property rights.
By the same token, many of today's public lands plaintiffs resemble
the traditional regulatory beneficiary whose interests are affected by the
agency regulation (or deregulation) of others. They seek judicial review
under the APA based on harm to interests within the zone of protection
of FLPMA and other modern public land management statutes that embody a range of values, including protection and preservation of public
natural resources. The realization of the conservation-oriented values
they assert, of course, depends on the limitation of the extractive use of
public land which, in turn, depends on the exercise of agency discretion
to that end. The emergence of these non-extractive values in public land
law coincided with an increase in public participation rights and opportunities at the agency level and more effective use of the APA's judicial
review provisions by public interest groups.
But there is a key difference between the reformation of public land
law in the 1960s and 1970s and the broader reformation of administrative
law which Professor Stewart analyzed. Stewart's reformation, as de241.
242.

Id.
E.g., Mining Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-23, 26, 28; Homestead Act of 1862, 12 Stat.

392 (1862) (repealed 1976).
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scribed above, was a judicially-driven effort to counteract undue influence over agency discretion by regulated industries. Such influence was
the cause of agency failure to effectuate congressional goals, and the
very legitimacy of administrative law depended on redressing systemic
agency bias. The reformation of public land law, by contrast, was congressionally-driven. It reflected a new ordering of public values in public land management. The reordering was away from the public value of
natural resources development, effectuated by creation of private interests in public land, toward a set of public values of conservation that
were not reducible to traditional private interests or their equivalent. In
this perspective, the new public interest plaintiff is not in a meaningfully
different position than the traditional "private rights" plaintiff asserting
injury to statutorily-created property interests.
D. The Public Lands and the CounterreformationofAdministrative Law
What, then, to make of Scalia's use of standing and mandamus doctrine to curtail judicial review rights of environmental advocates in the
public land cases? One conclusion would be that, if Scalia wanted to
lead a counterreformation of administrative law, public land law should
not be the place to start. That is because there is no valid traditional
model to which to roll back in the context of public land law. The notion
that the traditional public lands plaintiff for whom Scalia brushed aside
the doctrine of sovereign immunity was asserting a private interest that is
the proper subject of judicial intervention is illusory. The private interest
in such a case is only a proxy for the public interest in promoting natural
resources development through disposing of the public lands. There is
no valid basis for providing such proxy rights any greater judicial protection than modem environmental interests.
Another conclusion, however, is that the public lands provide something of a safe haven from which to launch a counter reformation of administrative law. First, public lands management involves vast discretion and among the broadest permissible legislative delegations of
power.24 3 The discretion is often the result of intentionally broad statutory standards, such as multiple use.2 " Sometimes, as in SUWA, it is a
product of the many different ways a mandatory statutory standard might
be achieved.245 Second, as the constellation of public values in public
land management grew, so did the complexity of administrative process
through which those values are to be realized. Public land agencies now
must uniformly engage in comprehensive land use planning such as that
243.
Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 1021-47 (2000) (discussing the delegation
doctrine and the public lands).
244.
16 U.S.C. § 531; see George C. Coggins, Regulating FederalNatural Resources: A Summary CaseAgainst Devolved Collaboration,25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 602, 610 (1999).
245.
See SUWA, 124 S. Ct. at 2381 (2004).
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mandated by FLPMA. And most decisions made in plans are not selfeffectuating but rather must be implemented through future, specific decisions. The "considerable legal distance" between the exercise of discretion at the planning stage and the implementation of policy on the
ground conveniently provides cover for judicial efforts to buttress doctrines that protect executive discretion from judicial oversight.24 6
CONCLUSION

Which brings us back to the distinctiveness of the public land law
and its pedigree as an original field of American administrative law. In
Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, Professor Scalia recognized
that public land law was at once distinctive and broadly prophetic. Its
distinctiveness enabled the development of a doctrine, the inapplicability
of sovereign immunity, on a different path than administrative law generally. Its pedigree foretold the eventual application of the rule against
sovereign immunity to challenges to administrative action, even if by
means of legislative action. There is probably no better an indication of
the prophetic value of a law professor's ideas than whether that professor
becomes a Justice on the Supreme Court. True to prophesy, in the public
land cases, standing and the traditional ministerial-discretionary dichotomy have emerged from Justice Scalia's pen as potent doctrines to protect executive discretion. As a practical matter, Scalia has effectuated a
sort of counterreformation of judicial review in public land cases.
Whether this, too, is a prophecy for administrative law, we can only wait
to see.
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